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rAbstract
The reaction of the German labor market to the Great Recession 2008/09 was
relatively mild – especially compared to other countries. The reason lies not only in
the specific type of the recession – which was favorable for the German economy
structure – but also in a series of labor market reforms initiated between 2002 and
2005 altering, inter alia, labor supply incentives. However, irrespective of the mild
response to the Great Recession, there are a number of substantial future challenges
the German labor market will soon have to face. Female labor supply still lies well
below that of other countries and a massive demographic change over the next 50
years will have substantial effects on labor supply as well as the pension system. In
addition, due to a skill-biased technological change over the next decades, firms will
face problems of finding employees with adequate skills. The aim of this paper is
threefold. First, we outline why the German labor market reacted in such a mild
fashion, describe current economic trends of the labor market in light of general
trends in the European Union, and reveal some of the main associated challenges.
Thereafter, the paper analyzes recent reforms of the main institutional settings of the
labor market which influence labor supply. Finally, based on the status quo of these
institutional settings, the paper gives a brief overview of strategies to combat
adequately the challenges in terms of labor supply and to ensure economic growth
in the future.
Keywords: Unemployment, Labor force participation, Labor supply, Benefit systems,
Public policy
JEL codes: J26, J38, J681. Introduction
The reaction of the German labor market to the Great Recession 2008/09 was – especially
compared to other countries – relatively mild. This “German Miracle” occurred due to
various reasons. On the one hand, Germany had to – unlike countries such as Ireland and
the United States, which both faced a slump in domestic demand combined with a real
estate crisis – deal with a world demand shock that mostly affected economically strong
firms (Rinne and Zimmermann 2011; Schneider and Gräf 2010). On the other hand, vari-
ous flexibility instruments at the firm level, combined with discretionary adjustments of the
institutional framework by policy makers (i.e. enhancement of the short-time work
schemes), enabled firms to adjust their workforce along the internal rather than the2012 Caliendo and Hogenacker; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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and 2005, initiated to fight the high and persistent unemployment that had evolved since
the end of the seventies, had significantly altered the core elements of the labor market,
including active and passive labor market policies, the organizational structure of labor
offices as well as the pension system. The speed and depth of the reforms were quite
remarkable when it is considered that the German welfare state had been typically depicted
as the prime example of a “frozen welfare state”, highly resistant to change (see, among
others, Esping-Andersen 1990; Manow and Seils 2000; Kemmerling and Bruttel 2005;
Konle-Seidl et al. 2010). In summary, the actions taken during the reforms led to higher
working incentives and better matching between labor demand and supply in the period
before the Great Recession, and were therefore considered as one of the main reasons for
the mild reaction (Gartner and Klinger 2010). The reforms also had the general goal of
increasing the labor force participation of those with young families.
However, irrespective of the mild response to the Great Recession, there are a
number of substantial future challenges the German labor market will soon have
to face. Since Germany will – like many other Western European countries – fur-
ther experience a massive demographic change over the next 50 years, the devel-
opment of labor supply of women and older people will become increasingly
important in determining the extent to which the working population will de-
crease (OECD, 2005). Although the employment rates of both groups have in re-
cent years increased, challenges still remain. The current tax and transfer system
has so far favored the sole male bread-winner model and therefore causes the ab-
solute working-time hours of economically active women to lie well below that of
other Western European countries. Together with the trend of a persistent low
fertility rate, the sustainable economic growth of Germany is in jeopardy in the
near future due to a decrease of employment potential (OECD 2012). Moreover
– although the employment rate of older people lies well above the EU-27 aver-
age and has also significantly increased since 2002 – the actual average
retirement age continues to lie well below the statutory retirement age. This
means there is some maneuverability for potential improvement. However, since
older people are often discriminated against in favor of younger people, which
often results from a misperception of their working potential, there is not only a
need for further social benefit reform, but also for enhancing prospects of life-
long learning (Eichhorst 2011). Labor demand of firms is expected to decrease
less than labor supply over the next decades (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR), 2011), and due to a persistent skill-biased
technological change – inducing a decrease of low-skilled jobs in the industry and a
considerable growth in occupations requiring higher skills (Spitz-Oener 2006; OECD
2011a) – firms will find it harder to find employees with adequate skills. Employment op-
portunities for individuals with low education levels will significantly decrease (European
Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2010), emphasizing the need for facili-
tating access to higher education for a larger share of the population.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it analyzes past reforms of main institutional
settings of the labor market which have influenced labor supply in Section 2. We out-
line the political and economic situation before 2002 and provide a brief description of
the first set of labor market reforms in Section 2.1. This is followed by a discussion of
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(see Section 2.2); pensions and early retirement (see Section 2.4); and active labor market
policies, since the most recent reforms put an emphasis on increasing labor supply incen-
tives as well (see Section 2.3). Wherever possible, we summarize the effects of these
reforms in a comprehensive way. Furthermore, the paper outlines why the German labor
market reacted in such a mild fashion during the “Great Recession” (Section 3.1), describes
current economic trends of the labor market in light of general trends in the European
Union, and reveals some of the main challenges associated with these trends in Section 3.2.
The challenges for the education system and lifelong learning are discussed in Section 4.1,
before an examination of the role of the current tax system in Section 4.2 and a recent
initiative to increase labor supply of young families in Section 4.3 are introduced. Based on
the status quo of these institutional settings, the paper also provides an overview of
strategies to combat the above-mentioned challenges in terms of labor supply and to
ensure economic growth in the future.
2. Institutional settings and labor market reforms in the last decade
2.1 The economic situation before 2002 and the first set of labor market reforms
Many European countries had to face high unemployment rates in the 1990s, but
Germany had especially proven to be unable to benefit from favorable conditions in the
global economy by that time. At only 1.8%, GDP growth between 1991 and 2003 was
only half of the UK growth rate, leading to decreasing employment and increasing
unemployment (Jacobi and Kluve 2007). Germany’s slow response to the worsening
labor market situation can only be explained by a long period of reform blockage and
postponement in labor market policy adjustments (Reformstau, see Eichhorst and Marx
2009). Reunification in 1990 certainly played a major role, where ALMP (and passive
income support systems, like early retirement) were used to take “surplus labor” out of
the labor market. A clear indication of this is that the number of participants in job-
creation schemes and training programs in 1992 exceeded the number of unemployed
in East Germany. Since deficits in the unemployment insurance schemes and the
budget of the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) were either covered by the federal
government or by higher contributions of employers and employees, this resulted in
rising non-wage labor costs which in turn hampered employment creation (Konle-Seidl
et al. 2010). The left-wing coalition in power since 1998 was torn between stabilizing
the traditional “German social policy” approach and introducing the concept of an
“activating state” in UK “New Labour” style.
The first step made effective from January 1, 2002, was the so-called Job-AQTIV
amendment, which changed the focus of German labor market policy from a reactive
to an activating one (Wunsch 2006). The main elements of this amendment were the
introduction of qualitative profiling of job-seekers upon unemployment registration
with the Local Employment Agency (LEA) and the establishment of a compulsory written
agreement between the LEA and the job-seeker (Eingliederungsvereinbarung) in order to
determine the duties and efforts of both contracting parties during the job-search process.
In addition strategies were put in place to reach re-placement targets. The amendment
postulated a more appropriate and flexible use of ALMPs and simplified other ones
(Wunsch 2006). Comprehensive evaluations of ALMPs were explicitly enshrined in the
law by the Job-AQTIV amendment (§ 282, Social Code (SC) III) for the first time.
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in the beginning of 2002, the government took advantage of this scandal and appointed
an independent expert commission, which worked out the blueprint for the reform
package known as the Hartz Reforms1. This reform package consisted of four laws
(Hartz I-IV), which were implemented incrementally between January 1, 2003, and
January 1, 2005, and introduced some rather radical changes in German labor market
policy. Hartz I introduced the concept of personnel service agencies (Personal-Service-
Agenturen), which were attached to LEAs and were supposed to employ unemployed
individuals, hire them out to companies and organizations, and train them when not
hired out. Hartz I also tightened the conditions for the acceptability of jobs and intro-
duced training vouchers unemployed individuals could use to get training from approved
providers. The second amendment, Hartz II, introduced new regulations for minor jobs
(Mini- andMidi-Jobs) and a second start-up subsidy (Ich-AG) for unemployed individuals
starting in self-employment (in addition to an already existing start-up subsidy scheme).
Hartz III addressed the organizational structure of public employment services, and
altered existing programs, as well as introducing new ones, within the area of ALMP
(for more details, see Section 2.3).
2.2 Unemployment benefits, social assistance and Hartz IV
The Hartz IV amendment had the most dramatic change, since it replaced the former un-
employment assistance and social assistance by a single means-tested replacement scheme
for needy unemployed job-seekers and their household. Prior to the reforms, Germany
had a system of income protection which was based on three pillars: 1) unemployment
benefits, 2) unemployment assistance and 3) social assistance. The following brief
description of these three elements will help for comparison with the new system (see
Konle-Seidl et al. 2010, for a detailed description).
Unemployment benefits (UB, Arbeitslosengeld) provided earnings-related income
replacement for a limited duration of 6 to 32 months if the unemployed individual had
been in employment covered by social insurance for at least 12 months. The legal basis
for UB was the SC III. The replacement rate of UB was dependent on family status,
while the duration was dependent on age and previous employment duration.
Unemployed individuals with at least one child were entitled to 67% of net remuner-
ation and 60% otherwise. UB claims were based on an employment record and pro-
vided benefits proportional to prior earnings within the reference period. Individual
means or needs were not taken into account. The maximum duration of UB varied
between 6 to 32 months. Workers who had been employed less than 12 months within
the last seven years before entering unemployment were not entitled for UB, whereas
12 months of employment meant a claim period of six months. This period rose
proportionally to the number of months in employment. However, several discontinu-
ities with respect to age existed (see Table 1). For someone under 45, the maximum
entitlement period was 12 months (given a minimum employment period of at least 24
months), whereas people above 45 (and under 47) could claim up to 18 months.
Further discontinuities were built in at age 47 (up to 22 months), 52 (up to 26 months)
and 57 (up to 32 months). The benefits were funded by matching employer and
employee contributions and administered by the FEA, which was traditionally also in
charge of implementing ALMPs.















in last 5/7 years
Prior to the Hartz Reforms February 1, 2006 - February 28, 2008
6 - 12 6 - 12
8 - 16 8 - 16
10 - 20 10 - 20
12 - 24 12 - 24
14 45 28 15 55 30
16 45 32 18 58 36
18 45 36 Since March 1, 2008
20 47 40 6 - 12
22 47 44 8 - 16
24 52 48 10 - 20
26 52 52 12 - 24
28 57 56 15 50 30
30 57 60 18 55 36
32 57 64 24 58 48
Source: SC III (§117 et seq.).
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eligible for unlimited and means-tested unemployment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosenhilfe).
These benefits were still earnings-related (57% / 53% replacement rate with/without
children) and provided income support for unemployed people who had some prior
employment experience but had become long-term unemployed. In contrast to UB, UA
was granted for an unlimited period (as long as individuals were available for the labor
market) and funded by the Federal budget, that is, by general taxation. This scheme was also
implemented by the FEA. In principle, recipients of UA had access to similar active labor
market schemes as UB recipients. This distinction becomes important when we discuss the
reformed system.
Finally, social assistance (SA, Sozialhilfe), provided basic income protection on a means-
tested and flat-rate basis for all German inhabitants. This assistance was independent of
employment experience but conditional on not having other resources of earned income,
social benefits or family transfers. Therefore, SA was a safety net for unemployed individuals
with either no employment experience or unemployment benefit/assistance claims that did
not match the guaranteed minimum income. Konle-Seidl et al. (2010) note that means-
testing was harsher in the SA scheme (compared to the UA scheme) and every job was con-
sidered acceptable. SA was funded by the municipalities that were also responsible for
reintegrating recipients into the labor market through specific active measures. A fairly rudi-
mentary labor market policy scheme was available – called “Help to Work” – and operated
by the municipalities, with a considerable scope of discretion. There was no entitlement to
integration measures by the FEA (Konle-Seidl et al. 2010) and even if capable of work, many
of those in need were not registered as unemployed with the FEA (Bernhard et al., 2008).
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came into force with some major changes in the system. Most importantly, the former
unemployment assistance and social assistance were replaced by a single means-tested re-
placement scheme – unemployment benefit II (UB-II, Arbeitslosengeld II) – for
needy unemployed job-seekers and their household. This scheme is tax-financed
and covers needy job-seekers who are capable of working but not entitled to un-
employment benefits – now called unemployment benefits I (UB-I, Arbeitslosen-
geld I) – or after UB-I has expired. The amount of UB-II does not depend on
former income and needy job-seekers and their household are predominately
registered as unemployed and may receive employment services (different from those
for UB-I recipients). For UB-I recipients, the most drastic change concerned the duration
of benefit entitlement (see Table 1). The maximum duration was cut down to 12 months
for people aged below 58 years. For people aged above this threshold the maximum dur-
ation was elevated to 24 months, but only if they had worked for at least 48 months in
the last five years before becoming unemployed. Initially, the reductions were even more
severe before they were relaxed again due to political unrest. Between February 1, 2006,
and February 28, 2008, only two discontinuities were in place: for people aged at least 55,
the maximum duration was set to 15 months (with 30 months of employment before)
and 18 months (with at least 36 months of employment).
The Hartz Reforms radically changed the German system of wage-related welfare.
In contrast to the old scheme, the new UB-II system now had a dual aim. Al-
though designed to prevent poverty, it does not secure previous living standards.
Thus, for those having received social assistance before, the new legislation actually
allows them to receive marginally more money and access to job employment ser-
vices (Konle-Seidl et al. 2010). For former recipients of UA, the level of transfer
payment decreased. Apart from its social policy objective, the aim of the reform
was to lower unemployment but also to ease the burden of taxation and non-wage
labor costs by reducing benefit dependency. The major lever to achieve this goal
was the shortening of individual unemployment spells through accelerated job
placement and more coherent activation of the beneficiaries of unemployment in-
surance benefits and unemployment or social assistance. Less generous benefits for
long-term unemployed, stricter job suitability criteria and more effective job place-
ment and active labor market schemes were the instruments to achieve this goal.
Only a few empirical studies have evaluated the macroeconomic effects of the
Hartz Reforms in detail. Fahr and Sunde (2009) as well as Klinger and Rothe
(2010) use a stock-flow matching approach based on administrative data from the
FEA to determine the speed of unemployment outflows after the first three Hartz
Reforms. Their results indicate that the first two reform waves did indeed have a
significant positive impact on the process of job creation. Both studies, however,
emphasize that their results might be prone to measurement error, since the FEA
changed definitions and statistics during the reform process, often making clear-cut
identification strategies impossible. Furthermore, the studies also make no state-
ments concerning the quality and the duration of new jobs.
To sum up, the Hartz Reforms between 2002 and 2005 considerably changed the
institutional settings of the labor market in Germany. However, not only had the passive
labor market policy (i.e. social assistance and unemployment benefits) been changed
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Reforms, which we describe in the following section.
2.3 Active labor market policy
Germany has a long tradition in the provision of ALMPs, and their expenses range
among the highest in the budget of the FEA (for comprehensive overviews, see, among
others, Caliendo and Steiner 2005; Wunsch 2006; Bernhard Hohmeyer et al. 2008b;
Eichhorst and Zimmermann 2007). ALMP programs generally aim at increasing the
employability of the unemployed to support their integration into the labor market. In
contrast to many other policy schemes, ALMPs have always been subject to a consistent
and dynamic transition in the light of structural and societal adjustment processes of the
labor market (Heyer et al. 2011). There are three main categories of ALMPs: subsidized
employment, labor market training, and public job-creation schemes. Whereas the first
includes schemes targeted at the long-term integration of unemployed individuals into
the first labor market through temporary subsidies (i.e. wage and start-up subsidies), the
second aims at enhancing the chances for re-employment through various measures of
short-term and further vocational training. The third is targeted especially at the long-
term unemployed with minor prospects of a swift integration into the first labor market
(i.e. 1-Euro-Jobs).
During the Hartz Reforms, a crucial shift had been made towards ALMPs that
require a more proactive behavior of unemployed individuals. Jacobi and Kluve (2007)
describe the Hartz Reforms as a tripartite reform strategy aimed at: (1) improving labor
market services and policy measures in terms of effectiveness and efficiency; (2) activating
the unemployed based on the principle of “rights and duties” (Fördern und Fordern); and
finally (3) stimulating labor demand by deregulating the labor market. More specifically,
since the Hartz Reforms, unemployed individuals have had to carry out all necessary
duties set out in an integration agreement (Eingliederungsvereinbarung) to become re-
integrated into the labor market (Konle-Seidl et al. 2010). These agreements result from
the profiling process of the unemployed, listing the services that will be provided to the
job-seeker as well as the job-seeker's obligation towards the employment agency, for
example in terms of job-search activities and participation in labor market programs.
The Hartz Reforms also introduced sanction elements in order to effectively monitor
the unemployed’s search activities and personal efforts to return into the regular labor
market. Sanctions in form of temporary benefit reductions could be used, if the
unemployed individual does not comply with the integration agreement or does not
accept a suitable offer to work. Furthermore, an improved targeting of active measures
and a better allocation of resources were additional aims. This was mainly done by
profiling “customers” into four types and addressing their needs accordingly. Finally, it
was also agreed upon to conduct rigorously scientific evaluations of all the measures
(see Jacobi and Kluve 2007, for more details).
As part of the reform realignments in 2003, integration subsidies were redesigned
and new forms of wage subsidies, start-up subsidies as well as jobs with reduced social
security contributions were introduced. Emphasis was shifted away from public job-
creation schemes, which have been proven to be ineffective (Caliendo et al. 2008). Since
then, ALMP in Germany has undergone a further two major reforms, which came into
effect in the beginning of 2009 and 2012. Both required considerable changes in the
Table 2 Entries into selected labor market programs between 2006 and 2011
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Entries into program
Wage subsidies (Eingliederungszuschüsse)
SC II 106,300 135,800 124,000 127,300 85,900 115,100
SC III 120,200 123,600 139,700 149,900 66,000 85,900
Further vocational training (Berufl. Weiterbildung)
SC II 110,300 167,200 225,500 244,600 141,500 166,500
SC III 154,500 211,300 260,000 400,400 211,100 158,300
Public job creation I (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen)
SC II 62,400 53,000 64,000 6,100 51 56
SC III 16,700 16,200 6,500 5,000 1,600 1,200
Public job creation II (1-Euro-Jobs) 741,900 798,700 823,200 812,300 421,000 475,200
Short-term training (Trainingsmaßnahmen)
SC II 444,100 546,000 627,700 256,700 1,100 -
SC III 533,600 519,800 586,900 229,500 161 -
Contracting-out placement services (Beauftragung Dritter)
SC II 140,400 119,400 189,800 105,700 - -
SC III 142,600 120,700 254,000 108,200 - -
Start-up subsidy (Ich-AG) 42,800 - - - - -
Bridging allowance (Überbrückungsgeld) 108,300 - - - - -
New-start up subsidy (Gründungszuschuss) 33,600 126,000 119,300 137,100 146,500 133,800
Source: Yearly Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency.
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abolishment and redevelopment of old ones. Table 2 contains the number of entries in
selected programs for 2006 to 2011, distinguished by individuals falling under SC III
and needy job-seekers under SC II.
The most important programs covered by Social Code III are currently targeted
wage subsidies, start-up subsidies and further vocational training. During the
2009 reform, the activation measures, short-term training and private placement
services (contracting out) were subsumed under a general paragraph, making sep-
arate regulations for both schemes obsolete (Steinke et al. 2012). Therefore, the
yearly entry statistics of the FEA no longer distinguishes between the two
schemes. However, they are still considered to be important instruments in both
legal frameworks (Heyer et al. 2011). By far, the most important program covered
by SC II in terms of yearly entries is public job-creation schemes (1-Euro-Jobs;
see Hohmeyer and Wolff 2007).
All programs and organizational changes have been (and are currently still)
evaluated as part of the legal obligation contained in the Hartz Reforms. Since
there are hardly any social experiments on German ALMPs, the comparison usu-
ally relies on statistical techniques to create an appropriate control group2. This
has led to a broad collection on evaluation results on the effects of 1-Euro-Jobs
(Hohmeyer 2009), benefit sanctions (Schneider 2008), start-up subsidies (Baum-
gartner and Caliendo 2008, Caliendo 2009, Caliendo and Kritikos 2009, and
Table 3 Effects of selected labor market programs






- Targeted wage subsidies paid
to employers for a limited period
- Feb-Apr 2005 - Large and significant positive effects




- Further vocational training - Feb-Apr 2005 - Share of unemployment benefit II
recipients decreases; employment
rate in the intermediate term




- Contracting out placement
services for UB-II recipients
- Feb-Apr 2005 - Locking-in effects in first months
after start
- 25 months - Employment rates are raised by
about two %-points for East German





(formerly §57 SC III)
- Jul-Sep 2003 - High employment and modest
income effects for participants;
considerable additional job creation
for bridging allowance (small job
creation for start-up subsidy)
- Start-Up Subsidy
(formerly §421 SC III)
- 56 months
Hohmeyer (2009) - Work opportunities/“1-Euro-Jobs” - Feb-Apr 2005 - Small positive employment effects
28 months after program start for
women in East and West Germany
as well as men in West Germany
- Paid in addition to UB II - 28 months
Rinne et al. (2011) - Different program types of
further vocational training
- Year 2002 - All program types have on average
a significant positive impact on
employment prospects 24 months
after program entry
- 28 months
Schneider (2008) - Benefit sanctions for UB II
recipients not complying with
requirements supposed to fasten
reintegration in labor market
- Jan 2005 - No significant effect on reservation
wage of UB II recipients
- 11 months
Note: All studies use propensity score matching methods based on administrative data.
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and Nivorozhkin 2008), private placement services/contracting out (Bernhard and
Wolff 2008), targeted wage subsidies (Bernhard et al. 2008a, 2008c), and further
vocational training (Rinne et al. 2011; Bernhard and Kruppe 2012). Whereas
start-up subsidies, and targeted wage subsidies have been found to be quite posi-
tive, the effects for 1-Euro-Jobs are rather negative (see Table 3). The effects of
further vocational training programs are quite heterogeneous depending on the empirical
method, observation period, and data source used (Rinne et al. 2011). Nevertheless, these
results can provide sound guidance for policy makers in further developing the institu-
tional framework to adjust to structural changes of the labor market (Heyer et al. 2011).
However, one main problem of impact evaluation in the dynamic field of ALMP are
considerable time lags between program implementation and first evaluation results,
which is mainly due to data and budget constraints, but also inevitable for ex-post analyses
interested in medium- and long-term effects. Therefore, evaluation studies often refer to
programs that have already been restructured. Moreover, there is still a considerable need
for further research. Many schemes can only be insufficiently evaluated by standard statis-
tical techniques. This mostly concerns activation measures such as vocational training for
young individuals with a short labor market history (see, e.g., Caliendo et al. 2011).
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Germany has one of the most generous public pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension insur-
ance systems in the world, providing pensions to all private- and public-sector
dependent employees, with the exception of civil-servants and the self-employed. It
leads to high effective replacement rates and low effective retirement ages. In 2011, the
average retirement age in Germany was roughly 61 for both men and women and
therefore still lay well below the current statutory retirement age of 67. Institutional
settings in Germany have long provided various incentives for older people to exit the
labor market before the statutory retirement age, some of which we describe here (for a
more detailed overview, see Eichhorst 2011). On the other hand, there are also demand
factors contributing to early retirement that interact with these institutional settings.
Firms might want to replace older workers for younger ones due to various reasons.
Finally, early retirement might be the only option for older workers, since they face
limited or unattractive employment opportunities. In this section, we explore certain
aspects of early retirement, with a focus on institutional settings and provide a brief
overview of the main characteristics of the German pension system.
The core of the public pension system in Germany provides old-age pensions for
workers aged 60 and older, disability pensions for workers under 60 and survivor benefits
for spouses and children. It is often characterized as a three pillar scheme: the first pillar
– the public retirement insurance (PRI, Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung) – contains the
elements mentioned above. It is laid down in SC VI and covers about 85% of the German
workforce including public-sector workers that are not civil servants. The second pillar
includes the occupational and the subsidized pension scheme, whereas the third pillar
contains elements of private pension plans, such as portfolios, real assets and private
pensions that are not subsidized.
Early retirement schemes had rapidly grown due to a social policy shift at the begin-
ning of the 1970s, which aimed at taking surplus labor out of the labor market and to
replace old by young workers. This was done mostly because of industrial restructuring
and to fight unemployment in times of weak economic growth. This policy shift
initially led to a significant decline in the average retirement age until the 1980s, with a
slight rebound afterwards (Arnds and Bonin 2002). After reunification, German labor
market policy reinforced early retirement schemes again to avoid a substantial increase
of unemployment within the new Länder. Only after a massive increase of social security
contributions and non-wage labor costs as well as in the light of ramifications of the
demographic change did the government fundamentally alter retirement policies through
a series of reforms starting in the early 1990s. The last major amendment to the pension
system took place in 2007. The statutory retirement age of 65 will be gradually and incre-
mentally raised to 67. Starting from 2012, and with the birth cohort of 1947, the age limit
will be increased by one month per year and birth cohort. This means that the birth cohort
of 1958 will have to work up to the age of 66. The mandatory retirement age of 67 will be
reached for all birth cohorts born from 1964 onwards by 2029 (Bonin 2009).
The German pension system today still allows for certain transitions into early retirement,
although in a much more restrictive way. In general, individuals may retire voluntarily at
any time between 63 and the full statutory retirement age, which is currently the age of 67.
As compensation for the longer duration of pension payments, however, the pension reform
in 1989 reduced the pension by 0.3% for each month of commencement of the pension
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the whole period of pension receipt, the aggregate pension loss can still be quite
substantial, given the conditional life expectancy of above 15 years at retirement age
(Berkel and Börsch-Supan 2003). Since 1957, the German pension system has allowed
for transitions from unemployment into early retirement under varying conditions
(Altersrente wegen Arbeitslosigkeit, SC VI §237). Today, this pathway to early retirement
is no longer possible for individuals born after January 1, 1952. Old-age part-time
(Altersteilzeit) constitutes a different possibility to reduce labor supply. Individuals who
have reached the age of 55 and have been subject to social security contributions for at
least three out of the previous five years, have the possibility to halve their remaining
working time until they reach the statutory retirement age. This can be done by (1) either
reducing the volume of the previous working time by half right away for the whole period
(“part-time model”); or (2) by continuing working full-time for the first half of the period
and being released from work in the second half (“block model”, see Wanger 2009, for an
extensive description of the old-age part-time employment act, Altersteilzeitgesetz).
Whether the individual takes the first or second option is subject to regulations within
collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees. In both cases, the
employee receives 70% of her former net wage while the employer contributes to the
pension system on the basis of 90% of the employee’s full-time employment compensation
(Arnds and Bonin 2002). In 2010, 16.3% of all newly retired individuals had previously
been in old-age part-time. On average, men entered into one of the old-age part-time
schemes at 57.6 (women at 57.0). Today, individuals in old-age part-time who were born
before January 1, 1952 may still obtain reduced old-age pensions at 60 if they had arranged
a part-time agreement with their employer before January 1, 2004.
To conclude, the early retirement policy of the 1970s has been reversed considerably
in light of the demographic change and a sustainable financing of the social security
system through a major policy shift, which started in the 1990s. The public turned away
from the perception that early retirement was a necessary means to keep unemployment
low and to force integration of young people into the labor market (Eichhorst 2011). In
combination with fundamental labor market reforms, the labor market participation of
older people has significantly increased since 2002.
3. Current labor market trends after the Great Recession in Germany
The previous sections have shown that the Hartz Reforms considerably changed the
institutional settings of the labor market in Germany. Moreover, we have outlined that
considerable efforts had further been undertaken in other areas of income support
systems, which are important for labor supply in Germany. However, these numerous
accomplishments should not conceal that Germany will face a number of substantial
future challenges, which we will start to elaborate on in the next sections. Before we do
so, we will first describe why the German labor market reacted in such a mild fashion
to the Great Recession in 2008/2009.
3.1 The mild response during the Great Recession 2008/2009
The reaction of the German labor market to the Great Recession 2008/2009 has been
very different from that of former recessions. Although the German economy had on
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Figure 1 Change in harmonized unemployment rates vs. change in real GDP growth in Germany,
G7 countries, and OECD -total: First half-year 2008 compared to first half-year 20091.
Source: OECD Statistics Database.
1GER-Germany, IT- Italy, JP-Japan, OECD-OECD-total, UK-United Kingdom, CA-Canada, FRA-France.
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(OECD), the increase in unemployment in the second quarter of 2009 was far lower
than the OECD average (see Figure 1). This is largely due to the fact that, in contrast
to Ireland and the United States for example, firms in Germany adjusted their working
hours during this crisis almost solely along the intensive margin by reducing hours per
worker. This unusual reaction compared to previous recessions was often depicted in
the media as miraculous. However, it can be put into perspective by looking at three
interdependent aspects – the previous labor market reforms, other flexibility instruments
and the type of the recession – which we briefly do now.
As already described in the previous section, Germany had introduced profound
reforms of the labor market, which fundamentally changed its institutional settings.
With regard to the mild response, two direct consequences of these reforms stand out:
First, the reduction of unemployment assistance and the aggravation of rules for suitable
employment overall increased the matching efficiency on the labor market, which in turn
also resulted in a decrease of long-term unemployment for the first time since the 1960s.
Second, the fact that more unemployed individuals were willing to take up less-paid jobs as
an outcome of the labor market reforms resulted in smaller wage pressure during collective
negotiations. Combined with a decrease in collective trade agreements, this led to an
average reduction of 2% of unit labor costs in Germany between 2000 and 2007, compared
to an average increase of 22% amongst all other OECD countries in the same period (OECD
2012). These two structural adjustments towards a new equilibrium left the labor market in
a robust condition at the eve of the Great Recession. Furthermore, the overall decrease in
unit labor costs made it possible for firms to build up financial reserves during the
economic upswing between 2006 and 2008, leaving them in a healthy financial state when
the economic crisis began (Schneider and Gräf 2010).
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allowed a higher flexibility in Germany. In 2009, the overall working time of
dependent employees was reduced by 41.3 hours (3.1%) on average compared to the
previous year (Fuchs et al. 2010). Basically, three instruments of working-time flexibility
at the firm level (working-time accounts, working overtime and the reduction of weekly
working hours) and one instrument at the state level (short-time work) involving subsidies
from the FEA made this adjustment in working hours possible (Dietz et al. 2011). The first
instrument at the firm level consisted of working-time accounts, which made it possible
for firms to adjust the number of hours worked depending on the business cycle. During
economic upswings, employees had accumulated working hours in their accounts through
unpaid overtime, which they then used up with free time during the economic downturn.
As a second instrument, paid working overtime was reduced by almost 20% in the first
quarter of 2009 (Dietz et al. 2011). The last instrument at the firm level, reduction of
weekly working hours, had recently been made more flexible due to new collective
agreements, most of which were made in the manufacturing sector. The greatest reduction
of average weekly full-time working hours was in the first quarter of 2009, with an average
decrease of roughly one hour compared to the previous year (Dietz et al. 2011).
Finally, short-time work (STW) was expanded dramatically during the Great Recession.
In May 2009, around 1.5 million workers were drawing benefits from the STW scheme
compared to 50,000 in September 2008, the month of the Lehmann insolvency (Statistik
der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2012). The main idea behind STW is to offer an alternative
to firms to lower labor costs without having to lay off workers. At the moment there are
three kinds of STW, out of which the so-called “STW for economic reasons” (§96, SCB III)
has mainly been applied during the economic crisis. A firm is eligible for this type of STW
if it is able to claim that it suffers a temporary and inevitable loss or stoppage of working
hours due to an aggravation of business conditions because of economic reasons. This
stoppage must result in a loss of wages of more than 10% of the monthly gross earnings of
at least one third of the firm’s employees. Furthermore, the firm must have already applied
all other possible flexibility options (i.e. reduction of overtime hours and the use of
working-time accounts). Then for each worker, the FEA then pays the firm up to 67% of
the individual net wage gap resulting from the loss of working hours for up to 24 months
(Crimman and Wießner, 2009). Taking the average number of subsidized working hours
into account, STW supposedly saved around 360,000 jobs (Möller 2010). In summary,
the greatest contribution to the overall reduction of the annual working hours in 2009
compared to 2008 was 13% and resulted from STW. The reduction of weekly working
hours contributed to the overall reduction with a share of roughly 10%, whereas the
reduction of paid overtime was almost 8%. Finally, working-time accounts were responsible
for 7% of the overall reduction of the yearly working hours (Fuchs et al. 2010).
The third aspect refers to the type of transmission mechanism through which the
crisis was hitting Germany. Whereas Ireland, Spain and the United States had to deal
with burdens resulting from structural adjustments due to the real estate crisis and
turmoil within the financial sector, Germany had not experienced a housing bubble and
was instead facing a fierce output decline due to a shortfall of world trade (Burda and
Hunt 2011). This output decline primarily hit the export oriented manufacturing sector
in Germany, which had experienced a strong upswing in the three previous years leading
up to the crisis in 2008 with an output growth rate being twice as high compared to the
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engaging in international trade are more productive and innovative than non-exporting
firms and, in the case of Germany, are mostly located in the manufacturing sector
(Wagner 2011). Hence, the Great Recession hit the strongest firms coming from an
upswing with profit shares between 42% and 45% in the three years leading up to the cri-
sis (Eurostat 2012). Because of the foregone upswing, workers in the manufacturing sec-
tor had also accumulated a significant surplus of working hours on their working time
accounts, which could then be used up during the crisis. It should also be stressed that
flexibility instruments only work well if they are used to dampen a demand shock that
has been induced externally and only lasts for a short period of time. This is why it
worked in Germany better than in other European countries with similar schemes
(Arpaia et al. 2010).
Taken together, these three aspects allowed firms to hoard labor deliberately, hoping
to be prepared for the next economic boom where they would need an often highly
specialized labor force.3.2 Labor supply and demographic change: future challenges ahead
Although the mild response to the Great Recession 2008/2009 has shown that the
German labor market has recently exhibited quite some resistance against external
economic shocks, it should not be concealed that there are some substantial future
challenges the German labor market will soon have to face. This becomes especially
obvious in the light of the ongoing demographic change which Germany will experience
over the next 50 years. As many other Western European countries, Germany experienced
a steep increase in the average life expectancy of women and men aged 65 during the
second half of the twentieth century, combined with a significantly decreased birth rate
since the 1960s. Forecasts of the Federal Statistical Office project that the old-age
dependency ratio3 will increase steeply until 2030 due to the baby boom generation retiring
between 2015 and 2030. This demographic change will fundamentally challenge the labor
market because it will lead to a decline in the economically active population. According to
the baseline scenario4, the working population is expected to decrease by more than 30%
until 2060 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). Under this scenario, labor supply in Germany
will significantly diminish for the first time since World War II (SVR 2011). Hence, the
question on how to maintain economic growth and sustainable financing of the public
pension and health system despite the decrease has become very important. In this context,
the development of labor supply of women and older people will therefore play a crucial
role in determining the extent to which the working population decreases (OECD, 2005).
The labor force participation of individuals aged 55 to 64 has admittedly risen significantly:
In 2011, the employment rate of this age group was around 60%, compared to 38% in 2001
(see Table 4), which was mainly caused by a rising female labor force participation (Garloff
et al. 2012). Nevertheless, there are still incentives for older people to either retire before
the statutory retirement age or to not seek employment because of limited or unattractive
employment opportunities. Therefore, the main challenge concerning the future labor
supply of older people is further increasing their working life, which could be achieved
by either raising the retirement age or increasing the employability of older workers
(OECD 2012).
Table 4 Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates for 2011, by different age
groups (in %)
Germany EU 27
Total Men Women Total Men Women
15-64 years
Employment rate 72.5 77.3 67.7 64.3 70.1 58.5
Unemployment rate 6 6.3 5.7 9.7 9.7 9.8
Inactivity rate1 22.8 17.5 28.2 28.8 22.4 35.1
55-64 years
Employment rate2 59.9 (37.9) 67 (46.5) 53 (29.4) 47.4 (37.7) 55.2 (47.7) 40.2 (28.2)
Unemployment rate 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.8 7.3 6.1
Inactivity rate 36 28.3 43.3 49.1 40.5 57.2
Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2011.
Notes: 1 According to the definition of the International Labor Organisation (ILO), an individual is classified as inactive if
he or she is not part of the labor force (i.e. not working at all and not available or looking for work either).
2 Numbers in parentheses are for 2001.
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share of employed women of working-age in Germany (68%) is 9 percentage points
higher than the EU-27 average (59%). However, the share of female individuals working
part-time is also considerable higher (48% vs. 31%, see Table 5). Taking into account
that around 15% of these women actually work part-time involuntarily, the low partici-
pation rate of women working full-time reflects negative incentives for an increase in
working hours. These negative incentives arise, on the one hand, from the current tax
and social welfare legislation in Germany, which still favors the sole male bread-winner
model. On the other hand, childcare facilities allowing parents to work full-time only
exist for 8% of the children under three in Germany.
For the overall labor market trend, another crucial component is the development of
labor demand. Although projections of future labor demand are very difficult and
prone to errors, it is generally expected that labor demand decreases less than labor
supply (SVR 2011). If the persistent reduction of structural unemployment in Germany
continues until 2020, many firms are expected to face the problem of skill mismatching
(Fuchs and Zika 2010). Due to a persistent skill-biased technological change and
increasing globalization, there will be a decrease of low-skilled jobs in the industry
and a considerable growth in occupations requiring higher skills (Spitz-Oener 2006;Table 5 Share of employed individuals (aged 25 to 64) working part-time and reasons
for working part-time in 2011 (in %)
Germany EU-27
Total Men Women Total Men Women
Part-time1 26.3 8.1 47.4 17.7 6.6 30.9
Reasons for working part-time
Undergoing education or training 4.6 15.1 2.8 3.1 7.1 2.1
Looking after children or incapacitated adults 24.7 4 28.3 26.4 5.3 31.6
Other family or personal reasons 26.4 7.6 29.5 17.4 10 19.2
Involuntary part-time employment2 17.1 32.5 14.5 25.8 39.7 22.4
Source: EU-LFS 2011.
Notes: 1 According to the ILO, a part-time worker is “an employed person whose normal hours of work are less than
those of comparable full-time workers” (Eurostat, 2008).
2 As percentage of the total part-time employment.
Table 6 Employment, unemployment, and inactivity rates of individuals aged 25–64
years by different education levels (in %)
Germany EU-27
Total Men Women Total Men Women
High education (ISCED1 level 5–6)
Employed 87.9 91 84 83.7 87.4 80.4
Unemployed 2.4 2.3 2.7 5.0 4.7 5.4
Inactive 9.9 6.9 13.7 11.8 8.3 15.1
Low education (ISCED1 level 0–2)
Employed 56.6 66.8 49.2 53.5 64.5 43.3
Unemployed 13.9 15.7 12.1 14.8 14.7 14.9
Inactive 34.4 20.8 43.9 37.2 24.5 49.2
Source: EU-LFS 2011.
Notes: 1 The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of the OECD divides the levels of education in six
categories: Pre-primary (level 1), primary (2), lower (3) and upper (4) secondary education, tertiary (5) education, and
advanced research programs (6) leading to the award of an advanced research qualification.
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employment opportunities for individuals with low education levels will significantly
decrease (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2010). The
significance of educational attainment for the labor market status can be seen from
Table 6, which displays unemployment rates for the economically active population
by education level for 2011.
Whereas the average unemployment rate in the EU-27 for the economically active
population (25–64) is roughly 15% for individuals with low education (ISCED5 level 0–2),
it is much lower (5%) for high-skilled individuals (ISCED level 5–6). This relationship is
even stronger for Germany: The unemployment rate for individuals aged 25 to 64 with
low education is 14% and therefore seven times larger compared to highly educated indivi-
duals (2%). Hence, low-educated people in Germany face a much higher risk of joblessness
than in other European countries. In 2009, 26% of the German population aged 25 to 34
had attained a tertiary education level. This share is below the OECD average (37%) and
had only slightly increased since 2002 (OECD, 2011d). Although Germany has on average
a high participation rate in education of individuals aged 15 to 24, it still has to catch up
concerning the educational outcomes of pupils – when compared to other economically
strong countries. According to the Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA) 2009 study, the reading and mathematical skills of 15-year-olds in Germany were
significantly higher than the OECD average but well below the highest scores (OECD
2010). Therefore, the elevation of the general educational level is still considered to be a
necessary requirement to sufficiently overcome the sectoral and societal changes of the
German economy (SVR 2009).4. Future challenges for labor supply policies
The previous sections have shown, that further reforms in various dimensions are
necessary in light of the ongoing demographic and technological change. Since educational
attainment concerning labor supply has become increasingly important, we explore some
issues related to challenges the education system faces in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes
why income splitting is still a source for reduced labor supply of women. The parental leave
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female labor supply is investigated in Section 4.3.4.1 Towards a new skill strategy: challenges of the education system
Nowadays, there are basically two main challenges linked to the education system, both
of which were described in Section 3.2. The demographic change means that the labor
supply of older people is closely linked to their employability, and hence, improving
strategies for lifelong learning. Second, due to the technological change, educational
attainment has become increasingly important, which basically amounts to raising the
overall education level and facilitating the access to tertiary education.
Financing on the job training for older people is less attractive for firms due to a
shorter working life of these people. The share of 50 to 64-year old employees partici-
pating in on the job-training has declined by 2 percentage points since 2007 and is
currently at 33% (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2012). This is still fairly
low compared to countries such as Sweden (OECD 2012). Moreover, there are still
considerable misconceptions of the productivity of older employees. The assumption
that working productivity decreases at an older age is wide spread. It is argued that
cognitive and physical skills decrease at a steeper rate than working experience
increases, leading to an overall decreasing working productivity (SVR 2011). This leads
to age discrimination of older workers (OECD 2011b). Hence, there is a reduced hiring
probability of older workers in Germany (Heywood, 2010). However, more recent
studies provide evidence that working productivity does not decrease for older people
(Malmberg et al. 2008; Göbel and Zwick 2009). A recent study by Börsch-Supan and
Weiss (2011) shows that the overall productivity of older people even increases slightly.
But even if firms were encouraged to employ older workers – which, for example, was
initiated in recent years by introducing wage subsidies targeted at older workers who
would be in danger of being laid off because of the seniority principle – training
measures could still be improved since older workers apparently do not often receive
the “right” training (Zwick 2011). In recent years, a number of collective agreements
have explicitly incorporated the promotion of employability of older people, and a
number of programs initiated by the Federal Government and several unions have been
adopted to raise public awareness for the working potential and the discrimination of
older people. These agreements are in harmony with the introduction of an amendment
in 2006 (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz), which explicitly forbids discrimination
because of gender, origin or age.
Besides raising the employability of older people, there is also a considerable need for
raising the education level in general. As described in Section 3.2, population ageing
and technological change will also increase the need for highly qualified individuals.
Therefore, improving the access to tertiary education in Germany in combination with
elevating the medium education level are considered to be of crucial importance (SVR
2011; OECD 2011a). Empirical studies stress that investments in education are most
fruitful if made during early childhood (see Cunha and Heckman 2007). There is also
empirical evidence pointing towards the fact that appropriate pre-primary education
has a positive effect on subsequent labor market outcomes, especially for children from
families in which the parents have only a low education (OECD, 2011a). Therefore, it is
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order to assure an efficient allocation of these expenditures (SVR 2009). However, the
current distribution of public expenditures on education is not in accordance with
these insights. In 2009, the highest share was spent for general education (ISCED 1–4,
35%) and tertiary education (ISCED 5–6, 18%). Only 9% of the budget was spent on
pre-primary education (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2012). Hence, more
efforts are still needed to expand pre-primary education and to place more emphasis
on early childhood development. Experts propose the expansion of nursery schools for
children aged 3 to 5, which is leading towards the concept of a mandatory pre-school
year before entering the primary education level (SVR 2009). Furthermore, the specific
early tracking in Germany into different school types at the onset of secondary education
level is often criticized because empirical studies show that early tracking increases
inequality, especially for children with a migration background (Hanushek and
Wössmann 2006). Early school tracking more or less determines the chances for an
entrance qualification to the upper level secondary education, which is still the only
regular path to university, and the tertiary education in Germany. As a result, policy
implications aim at a complete withdraw from early school tracking or to at least a
postponement of the decision to a later point in time (OECD 2012).
In light of an increasing number of young adults qualified for higher education, but a
stagnating share of individuals actually taking up a tertiary education, the German
government has already undertaken a number of measures to facilitate access to tertiary
education. Apart from granting more autonomy to universities, the government also
provides financial means to the different Länder, which in turn agreed to assure
additional university places until 2020.
4.2 Income splitting as a source for reduced labor supply
As described in Section 2.2, the number of hours worked by female employees in
Germany is comparatively low by international standards. This is mainly due to a high
share of female secondary-earners working only part-time for very few hours (OECD 2012).
It is often argued that the current system of income taxation creates fiscal disincentives for
secondary earners because Germany allows for “income splitting” between married partners
with regards to income taxation (Ehegattensplitting, § 32a (5) Einkommensteuergesetz). Since
1958, married couples living in the same household may choose between individual and
joint taxation. When choosing the latter, the taxable income of both spouses is cumulated
and the sum is then split in half. The income tax is calculated by applying the tax function
to the result and doubled in a third step to determine the tax liability of the couple. As a
result, the amount of the income tax of a married couple may be lower than the tax the
same couple would have to pay if both spouses were taxed individually according to the
principle of separate taxation (Schlick 2005). This results in a “splitting effect” and is seen
by critics as a strong disincentive for non-working spouses to take up work in the first place
or for secondary earners to start working full-time. In a progressive transfer system like the
German one, the tax advantage within the system of income splitting is highest when
earnings are distributed unevenly between both spouses. Hence, when taking up work or
increasing hours worked, secondary earners are confronted with a high marginal tax
rate (Gustafsson 1992)6. This is seen as a main reason for the relatively low labor force
participation rate of married women in Germany.
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experts to increase labor supply of women (OECD, 2011c, 2012). Steiner and Wrohlich
(2004) use a micro-simulation model to estimate potential labor supply effects of a shift
from joint taxation to individual taxation. The authors find that the female participation rate
would increase by around 4.85 percentage points and the total number of hours worked by
women would rise by 11%. However, many public finance experts maintain the contrary by
considering that there is no marriage gain from joint taxation at all. They rather argue that
joint taxation is a logical consequence of the progressive tax system in Germany given the
normative rule that taxation should be neutral with respect to the distribution of incomes
within the household (Schlick 2005). Moreover, taxing on a purely individual basis may
come into conflict with the constitutional law in Germany7.
In another paper, Dearing et al. (2007) compare Austria and Germany in terms of work
incentives created by the tax and transfer system and childcare institutions. Both countries
are quite similar in many institutional aspects but differ in their detailed characteristics
concerning the tax system: while in Germany married spouses are taxed jointly and are
eligible for full income splitting, Austria has a system of individual taxation. Moreover,
Austria has a much more generous parental leave benefit (PLB, Elterngeld) system. Hence,
it is interesting to note that labor force participation rates of mothers in Austria and
Germany are similar. However, full-time employment rates are much higher among
Austrian mothers. In order to establish to what extent these differences can be attributed to
differences in the tax-transfer system, the authors estimate structural labor supply models
for both countries and then interchange two important institutional characteristics: the
definition of the tax unit within the personal income tax and the PLB scheme. The results
show that differences in mothers’ employment patterns can be partly explained by the
different tax systems: individual taxation in Austria leads to lower marginal tax rates for
secondary earners and increases labor supply incentives. The authors argue that labor force
participation of German mothers would rise considerably if Germany were to introduce
Austria's income tax and PLB characteristics.
However, it seems to be very unlikely that the current status quo concerning the joint
taxation of married couples within a household will be changed any time soon, since this
would also imply major changes in other parts of the social transfer system as a necessary
condition in order to comply with constitutional norms (SVR, 2007). Nevertheless, there
are a number of proposals considering alternative forms of joint taxation, ranging from a
model of quasi-individual taxation where the personal exemption concerning the income
tax is transferred from the non-working to the working spouse (OECD 2012) and to differ-
ent systems of family taxation (for an overview, see SVR, 2007). These systems cannot be
covered in detail here. We instead focus on another income support system that has been
established in recent years with the aim to foster female labor supply.
4.3 Parental leave benefit
In addition to the low full-time labor force participation of women, Germany has also
one of the lowest fertility rates in Western European countries, and there is little hope
of expecting a substantial increase over the current rate of 1.4 any time soon (Spiess
and Wrohlich 2008). Although these trends had already been observed, the German
public has only just begun discussing these issues. The underlying reasons for this
unfortunate mix – low fertility and low participation – can be seen as a result of a
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full-time, for example an absence of childcare facilities, and rather strong and persistent
preferences of (West-)German parents to care for young children at home (Bonin 2009).
In addition, one should note that the labor force participation of mothers depends
crucially on the child’s age. Whereas only 11.5% of mothers whose youngest child is in its
first year of age are in gainful employment, the share escalates to around 40% when the
youngest child is between one and two years old. The highest employment share (78%) is
exhibited by mothers with the youngest child being between 12 and 15 (Bundesministerium
für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ), 2010). In light of the demographic
change and the need to secure future skill needs, it became obvious that facilitating the
return to work for young mothers had gained in importance (Deutsches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), 2012). The German government therefore passed a reform
of the PLB system (PLB, Elterngeld) in line with the Scandinavian model, which came
into effect in the beginning of 2007 and replaced the means-tested preceding benefit
(Erziehungsgeld)8. The PLB is provided for up to 14 months to parents of children born
on January 1, 2007 or later. The benefit replaces 67% of the average taxable income
earned in the 12 months prior to the birth of the child for the parent staying at home9.
The parent is eligible for benefit if he or she does not work full-time, which is defined as
30 hours per week. Besides the aim of increasing labor market participation of mothers
with young children and fostering involvement in childcare of fathers, the reform also
implicitly intended to increase fertility rates (Tamm 2009).
In 2009, the PLB was evaluated by the Federal Ministry for Families concerning the short-
term effects of the introduction of the benefit on employment behavior of parents with a
new-born child (BMFSFJ, 2009). The study was based on a mail survey of a sample of
parents (N = 1,595) whose child was born in April 2007 and who had applied for and
received PLB. The study finds that the majority of young mothers resumed employment
after having received PLB. Around 13% of women took up part-time work again after six
months, and 12 months after giving birth one third of all young mothers (31%) were already
re-employed. After 18 months the share was up to 39%, reaching 42% after 24 months.
However, two thirds of the women state that the infrastructure of childcare services is insuf-
ficient in their region. Along with the request of better in-firm childcare possibilities, these
results indicate that the PLB only develops its full impact in combination with better early
childcare services and more flexible models of working hours for women. To this date, only
a few empirical studies have explicitly analyzed the impact of the PLB on the fertility rate
mainly finding no statistically significant effects (Thyrian et al. 2010; Hoßmann et al. 2009).
5. Conclusions
The relatively mild reaction of the German labor market to the Great Recession 2008/09
was often called the “German Miracle”. However, various reasons are able to explain this
unusual response. First, the economic crisis mostly hit financially strong firms coming
from a long upswing leading towards to the crisis. These firms were able to hoard labor
deliberately due to a number of working-time flexibility instruments at the firm as well as
the state level. Second, in the years prior to the Great Recession, Germany had introduced
profound reforms of the labor market, which fundamentally changed its institutional
settings as well as income support systems and overall led to higher working incentives
and better matching between labor demand and supply. There was also a considerable
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collection on evaluation results providing sound guidance for policy makers in further
developing the institutional framework to adjust to structural changes on the labor
market. Overall, it is fair to say that Germany has been on the right track with the main
reforms of the labor market for the last 10 years.
Despite the mild response to the Great Recession, however, the paper has shown
that there are a number of substantial future challenges the German labor market
will soon have to face. Although the employment rate of women has recently grown con-
siderably, the current tax and transfer system still favors the sole male bread-winner
model and therefore causes the absolute working-time hours of economically active
women to lie well below that of other Western European countries. The same pattern
concerning employment rates applies to people aged 55 and older. Despite growing num-
bers, the actual average retirement age continues to lie well below the statutory retirement
age. Since the labor supply of both groups is becoming increasingly important in deter-
mining the extent to which the working population will decrease due to the massive
demographic change Germany will experience over the next 50 years, improving their em-
ployability remains one of the main challenges. Fundamentally reforming the current sta-
tus quo concerning the joint taxation of married couples within a household might not be
on the political agenda any time soon. Therefore, the main challenge rests upon improv-
ing the supply of childcare facilities to ensure that income support systems like PLB de-
velop their full impact. Concerning the labor supply of older people, recent reforms of the
pensions system, especially the reform in 2007 increasing the statutory retirement age to
67 from 2012 onwards, have provided the institutional framework to further increase the
labor market participation of older workers. However, further potential lies within the area
of lifelong learning and hence in increasing the employability of older people. Although
much has been done in this area in recent years, including a number of collective agree-
ments explicitly incorporating strategies to increase the employability of older people,
training measures could still be improved to ensure that older people receive the training
the really need. The ongoing technological and demographic change combined with
globalization is expected to lead to a skill mismatch since low-skilled jobs in the industry
will decrease and occupations requiring higher skills will increase. This will put special
emphasis on the importance of educational attainment on labor market status. Especially
within the area of access to tertiary education, the German government, in collaboration
with the Länder has already taken up measures to meet the challenges of promoting
higher skills. However, the prevalent system of early school tracking into different school
types is still vulnerable to family background and increases inequality of opportunity,
which led to proposals suggesting to completely withdraw from the system, or to at least
postpone the decision to a later point in time.
In conclusion, the German labor market has shown remarkable resilience to the
weakened economic conditions. However, meeting the challenges laid out in this
paper is crucial for establishing a solid basis for continuing economic growth, in
light of societal and structural changes in the country. In order to achieve this, a
coordinated effort in many institutional areas, including not only income support
and pensions systems, ALMPs, but also education, tax incentives and childcare,
will be needed. The paper has summarized some of the current challenges and
examined potential solution.
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1The Hartz Reforms were named after the chairman Peter Hartz, who headed the
commission. The official names of the Hartz I-IV laws were Erstes, Zweites, Drittes and
Viertes Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt (Bundesministerium für
Wirtschaft und Arbeit 2003).
2For an overview see, among others, Caliendo and Hujer (2006) or Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009).
3The old-age dependency ratio as defined by the Federal Statistical Office is the ratio
between the total number of elderly aged 65 and over and the number of those of
working age (from 20 to 64).
4The Federal Statistical Office projects a total of 12 demographic scenarios up to 2060,
which are based on the population level of 2008 and differ in terms of assumptions about
birth rate, increase in life-expectancy, and annual net migration. The baseline scenario
assumes a constant birth rate of 1.4 and an increase of the life expectancy of 7.8 (6.8)
years to 85 (89.2) years for boys (girls). The annual net migration is assumed to be
100,000 individuals from 2014.
5The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of the OECD divides
the levels of education in six categories: Pre-primary (level 1), primary (2), lower (3) and
upper (4) secondary education, tertiary (5) education, and advanced research programs
(6) leading to the award of an advanced research qualification (OECD, 2011d).
6As soon as the wife starts contributing to the family income, the “splitting effect”
becomes smaller. The more she contributes, the smaller is the gain from joint taxation
compared to a non-married couple. The marginal tax rate on second-earners is therefore
higher than for singles.
7In 1957, the German constitutional court (BVerfGE, Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled
that married couples should not be disadvantaged relative to non-married couples and
that an equal share of the total household earnings belongs to each person in a marriage
(BVerfGE 6, 55).
8Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz (BEEG).
9The monthly benefit ranges from 300 euros for low-income parents up to a maximum
rate of 1,800 euros.
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